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THE DISABLED EMPLOYEE AND REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE MINNESOTA
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: WHERE DOES
ABSENTEEISM ATTRIBUTABLE
TO THE DISABILITY FIT INTO THE LAW?
Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., I the Minnesota Court of Appeals
considered whether medical absences resulting directly from an em-
ployee's disability2 are a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to ter-
minate employment. 3 The court also considered the extent to which
1. 489 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992).
2. The employee was afflicted with rheumatoid arthritis. Id. at 806.
3. Id. at 808-09.
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current Minnesota law4 mandates reasonable accommodation for ab-
senteeism by the employer in that situation.5 The court held that
excessive absenteeism may be a legitimate and nondiscriminatory
reason for terminating a disabled employee even when absenteeism
is directly related to the employee's disability.6 The court declined
to require reasonable accommodation if a disabled employee's pro-
longed absences require the employer to hire a substitute employee
during those periods.7
This Case Note will provide an alternative analysis of Lindgren us-
ing the same legal guidelines, but resulting in a different outcome.
The intent of this analysis is to show that there is a void in the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act's (MHRA) purported protection for disabled
employees. The purpose and intent underlying the MHRA8 are not
adequately supported by the language of the statute. The MHRA
needs clarification of the protection afforded to qualified disabled
employees, especially regarding medically necessary absences di-
rectly related to the disability. Until the language of the statute is
changed to reflect the intent of the Act, drastic actions against dis-
abled employees may be taken with minimal cause.
Part II of this Case Note will explore federal and Minnesota disa-
bility discrimination protection for qualified disabled employees.
Part III will explain the facts of Lindgren and the court's holding and
analysis. Part IV will present an alternative analysis of Lindgren, con-
sidering factors that the court neglected to address. Part V will pro-
4. MINN. STAT. § 363.03(l)(6) (1992) states that it is an unfair employment prac-
tice for an employer with 25 or more full or part-time employees to not make reason-
able accommodation to the known disability of a qualified disabled person or job
applicant unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would im-
pose an undue hardship.
5. Lindgren, 489 N.W.2d at 809-10.
6. Id. at 809.
7. Lindgren, 489 N.W.2d at 810.
8. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03(l)(6) (1992). The general purpose of the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act is to place individuals discriminated against in the same posi-
tion they would have been in had no discrimination occurred. See Brotherhood of Ry.
Clerks, Lodge 364 v. Balfour, 303 Minn. 178, 195-96, 229 N.W.2d 3, 13 (Minn.
1975). The goal of the statute is to allow disabled persons to return to the work
force. LaMott v. Apple Valley Health Care Ctr., Inc., 465 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991).
Moreover, the intent of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, Wis. STAT.
§ 111.31(3) (1992), which is similar to the Minnesota Human Rights Act, is to en-
courage to the fullest extent possible the employment of all properly qualified indi-
viduals regardless of any handicap. McMullen v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n,
434 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). Furthermore, the Wisconsin legislature
intended that the Fair Employment Act be liberally construed to serve this purpose.
Ray-O-Vac v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor, & Human Relations, 236 N.W.2d
209, 214-15 (Wis. 1975).
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pose guidelines for future examination of this issue to ensure that
disabled employees are treated fairly and equitably.
II. DISABILrrY DISCRIMINATION
A. Federal Law
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 19739 was the first legislation to provide
federal protection to disabled individuals. The Act prohibited all
federal government employers and contractors from discriminating
against their employees, required them to use affirmative action to
employ individuals with disabilities,1O and provided that disabled in-
dividuals could not be excluded from participation in any program
receiving federal financial assistance, solely because of their
disability. II
In enacting the Rehabilitation Act, Congress enlisted all programs
receiving federal funds in an effort to "share with handicapped
Americans the opportunities for an education, transportation, hous-
ing, health care, and jobs that other Americans take for granted."12
Although this Act provided significant protection to federal govern-
ment employees, no federal protection existed for disabled job appli-
cants and employees in the private workplace.
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act' 3 (ADA) extends federal pro-
tection to disabled employees and job applicants against discrimina-
tion in private employment.14 The ADA is construed to provide at
least as much protection to disabled individuals in the private work
place as the Rehabilitation Act. 15
a. Coverage
Title I of the ADA, which deals with employment, states that em-
ployers may not discriminate against "qualified"16 applicants and
employees on the basis of disability.17 The ADA's coverage and pro-
tection will ultimately apply to employers with fifteen or more em-
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10. Id. §§ 701, 793.
11. Id. § 794(a).
12. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277 (1987) (quoting 123 CONG. REC.
13515 (1977) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991).
14. Id.
15. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) (1993).
16. See infra note 22 for the definition of a qualified disabled person.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991). The ADA's protection extends
1993]
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ployees, but for the first two years following the effective date, it only
applies to employers with twenty-five or more employees.18
b. "Disability" and "Qualified Disabled Person"
The ADA protects people who have a disability.' 9 The ADA de-
fines a "disability" as (1) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) a record of such
impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.20
to all aspects of an employer's practices, including job applications, hiring, advance-
ment, discharge, compensation, and job training. Id. § 12112(a).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(a) (Supp. III 1991). Coverage under the ADA began
July 26, 1992 for private sector employers with 25 or more employees and will begin
July 26, 1994 for employers with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)
(Supp. III 1991). The purpose for this delay is to give smaller employers more time
to prepare for compliance. UNITED STATES EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, A
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT I-I (1992).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. III 1991).
20. Id. § 12102(2). The ADA defines "physical or mental impairment" as
(A) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or an-
atomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neuro-
logical; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech
organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or
(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, or-
ganic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.
34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i) (1993). The existence of an impairment under the ADA is
to be determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines or pros-
thetic devices. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1993).
The term "substantially limits" means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared
to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the
general population can perform that same major life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1993).
A major life activity includes "functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1993). Major life activities are those activities that the average
person can perform with little or no difficulty. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (i) (1993).
The above list of activities is not exhaustive and can be expanded to include sitting,
standing, lifting, and reaching. Id.
An individual has a record of impairment if he or she "has a history of, or has
been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities." 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(iii) (1993).
An individual is regarded as having an impairment if he or she:
(A) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit
major life activities but that is treated by a recipient as constituting such a
limitation; or (B) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially lim-




The ADA does not prohibit discrimination against all individuals
with disabilities but only "qualified" individuals with disabilities. '- 21
A qualified individual is one who, with or without reasonable accom-
modation, is able to perform the essential functions of the position
which he or she holds or desires.22
c. Reasonable Accommodation
Employers are obligated under the ADA to make reasonable ac-
commodation for the known physical or mental limitations of a quali-
fied individual with a disability.23 The ADA defines "reasonable
Id. § 104.3(j)(2)(iv).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(a) (1993).
22. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m) (1993). A two-step analysis is used to determine
whether an individual is "qualified." First, it must be shown that the individual satis-
fies the prerequisites for the position, such as possessing the appropriate educational
background, employment experience, skills, licenses, etc. Id. Second, it must be
shown that the individual can perform the essential functions of the position, with or
without reasonable accommodation. Id.
The term "qualified" refers to whether the individual is qualified at the time of
the job action in question. The mere possibility of future incapacity does not by itself
render a person not qualified. Id.
The ADA defines "essential functions" as "the fundamental job duties of the
employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(n) (1993). A job function may be essential for any of several reasons, in-
cluding but not limited to:
(1) the reason the position exists is to perform that function;
(2) there are a limited number of employees available among whom the per-
formance of that job function can be distributed; and/or
(3) the function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the posi-
tion is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular
function.
Id. The ADA regulations indicate that the following evidence may be considered in
determining whether a particular function is essential:
(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing ap-
plicants for the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the
function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
Id. § 1630.2(n)(3).
The determination of whether certain job functions are essential is critical be-
cause an individual must be able to perform them in order to be considered "quali-
fied." Id. § 1630.2(m). If an individual is unable to perform the essential functions
of the job, even with reasonable accommodations made by the employer, such an
individual is not qualified and there is no obligation on the part of the employer to
hire or promote the individual to that job. Id. See also Lemere v. Burnley, 683 F.
Supp. 275, 280 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding plaintiff's unscheduled absences prevented
her from following a regular work schedule under which she could perform the es-
sential functions of her position).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (1993).
19931
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accommodation" as
(1) the modification or adjustment of a job application process to
enable a qualified individual with a disability to be considered for
the position;
(2) alterations in the workplace environment or manner in which
the work is customarily performed; or
(3) modifications or adjustments that enable a disabled employee
to enjoy the same benefits and privileges of employment as his or
her co-workers. 24
Examples of reasonable accommodation include: modification of ex-
isting employee facilities to provide for use by disabled individuals;
job restructuring; modification of work schedules; reassignment to a
vacant position; acquisition or modification of equipment or devices;
appropriate adjustment or modification of examinations, training
materials, or policies; and provision of qualified readers or
interpreters.25
In determining the accommodation appropriate for a particular
situation, the ADA suggests that the employer initiate an informal,
interactive process with the disabled employee in need of accommo-
dation.26 Through this process, the employer and employee should
seek to identify as precisely as possible, the limitations resulting from
the disability and the potential reasonable accommodations for those
limitations.27 An employer must provide appropriate accommoda-
tion unless it can be shown that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of the business.28
d. Undue Hardship
An accommodation is an undue hardship if its implementation
causes significant difficulty or expense.2 9 The ADA enumerates four
factors to be considered when analyzing hardship to an employer:
(1) the nature and cost of the needed accommodation;
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1) (1993).
25. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1993): The list of accommodation possibilities
found in the ADA also includes (1) permitting the use of accrued paid leave or pro-
viding additional unpaid leave for medically necessary treatment; (2) providing
transportation; (3) providing personal assistants, such as a page turner or a travel
attendant; or (4) providing reserved parking spaces. Id. The interpretive guide to
Title I of the ADA further defines reasonable accommodation as "any change in the
work environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individ-
ual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.9(a) (1993).
26. Id. § 1630.2(o)(3).
27. Id.
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (1993).
29. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (1993). In short, an undue hardship is "any ac-
commodation that would be unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or
that would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business." Id.
[Vol. 19
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(2) the overall size and financial resources of the facility involved
in the accommodation provision;
(3) the overall size and financial resources of the employer; and
(4) the type of operation of the employer.3 0
If the employer can show that an accommodation would create an
undue hardship, the disabled employee should have the opportunity
to provide his or her own accommodation.31 The employer must
provide as much of an accommodation that would not constitute an
undue hardship and would allow the disabled employee to provide
or pay for the remainder.32
B. Minnesota Law
The Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) prohibits employment
discrimination based on physical or mental disability.33
1. Coverage
The MHRA, with the exception of the reasonable accommodation
requirement, applies to all Minnesota employers.34 The reasonable
accommodation requirement applies to employers with a specified
number of employees.3 5 The MHRA's definitions of "disability" and
"qualified disabled person" are the same as the ADA's definitions.36
2. Reasonable Accommodation
The MHRA establishes an affirmative duty for certain employers
to make accommodations for qualified disabled employees or job ap-
plicants.3 7 If an employer fails to accommodate an employee's disa-
bility, the employer is guilty of an unfair and illegal employment
practice.S8
Four elements must be met before an employee may invoke the
reasonable accommodation statute.39 First, the employer must have
more than twenty-five part-time or full-time employees. Second, the
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2) (1993).
31. Id.
32. Id. In addition to undue hardship, the ADA provides that an employer is not
required to accommodate an individual who poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others in the workplace. Id. § 1630.2(r).
33. MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1) (1992).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 363.03(l)(6). Under this section, an employer is subject to the reason-
able accommodation requirement if it has at least 25 part or full time employees.
Effective July 1, 1994, the required number of employees decreases to 15. Id.
36. MINN. STAT. § 363.01(13), (35) (1992). For the ADA definitions, see supra
notes and 20-22 accompanying text.
37. Id. § 363.03(l)(6).
38. Id. § 363.03(1)(a).
39. Id.
1993]
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employer must have knowledge of the employee's disability. Third,
the employee must have a qualified disability. Fourth, the employer
must fail to make reasonable accommodation for the disability.40
The employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by
meeting these four elements. The employer, however, can defeat
the claim by showing that accommodation would impose an "undue
hardship" on the business.4 1
According to Minnesota case law, an employee's disability must
affect his or her job performance before the employer is liable for
breaching its statutory duty to make accommodations for the disabil-
ity. In Manderscheid v. Beyer,42 the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated
that the accommodation argument is applicable only where the em-
ployee was fired for poor job performance and there was a disability
affecting that job performance.43 The following year, in Karst v. F.C.
Hayer Co. ,44 the court of appeals determined that an employee could
have performed his duties with scheduling accommodations and that
only the employer's unwillingness to accommodate the disability
kept any accommodation from occurring.45
In 1991, the court of appeals held that a plan could be set up re-
quiring restructured work assignments so that two housekeepers
could work together.46 In LaMott v. Apple Valley Health Care Center
Inc., the court found unreasonable the employer's contention that
the team cleaning approach was cost prohibitive and impossible to
implement.47
Recently, in Finn v. National Camera Exchange, Inc.,48 the court of
appeals rejected an employer's argument that it had no obligation to
accommodate an employee's disability by reducing the number of
hours worked per week. Of significance, the court found that the
employer did not know whether the employee could work full time
when the termination decision was made.49 Because the discharge
occurred without knowledge of that vital piece of information, the
40. MINN. STAT. § 363.03(l)(6) (1992). The MHRA defines reasonable accom-
modation as including, but not limited to (1) making facilities readily accessible to
and usable by disabled persons; (2) job restructuring or modifying work schedules;
(3) acquiring or modifying equipment or devices; and (4) providing aides on a tem-
porary or periodic basis. Id.
41. MINN. STAT. § 363.03(l)(6) (1992).
42. 413 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
43. Id. at 230.
44. 429 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'don other grounds, 447 N.W.2d 180
(Minn. 1989).
45. Id. at 322.
46. LaMott v. Apple Valley Health Care Ctr., Inc., 465 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991).
47. Id.




grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded
to determine whether accommodation was required.50
Because reasonable accommodation analysis is fact specific, it
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Unfortunately, little Min-
nesota case law exists to date, making it difficult to predict the pa-
rameters of "reasonable" and "undue hardship" and to track the
law's evolution as more claims arise.
3. Undue Hardship
The MHRA incorporates the four ADA factors in its definition of
"undue hardship."51 Additionally, the MHRA requires a docu-
mented good faith effort to explore less restrictive or less expensive
alternatives, including consultation with the disabled person or with
other knowledgeable disabled persons or organizations. 52
C. Disparate Treatment: The McDonnell Douglas Test
In all employment claims brought under the MHRA involving dis-
parate treatment 53 or in claims where there is no direct evidence of
discrimination, Minnesota courts utilize the McDonnell Douglas54
test. 55 The Minnesota Supreme Court has emphasized that the trial
court is not required to "rigidly and mechanically" apply this analy-
sis. 56 Rather, the three-part analysis is merely a tool that provides a
sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence.57
Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the employee has the initial bur-
den to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance
of the evidence.58 A prima facie case may be established by showing:
(1) the employee is a member of a protected class; 59
50. Id.
51. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
52. MINN. STAT. § 363.03(l)(6)(e) (1992).
53. "The crux of a disparate treatment claim involving an employer's decision to
discharge an employee is that the employer is treating that employee less favorably
than others on the basis of an impermissible classification." Hubbard v. United Press
Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 442 (Minn. 1983); see also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(a)
(1993). An example of an employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory defense under
the disparate treatment theory is that an employee's poor performance is unrelated
to the individual's disability. Id.
54. McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
55. See, e.g., Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. 1986);
Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Minn. 1978).
56. Sigurdson, 386 N.W.2d at 721-22.
57. Id. at 722 (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
58. Id. at 720 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
252-53 (1981)).
59. In determining whether an employee is a member of a protected class, the
Minnesota courts look to the definition of disability under the Minnesota Human
Rights Act. See Cooper v. Hennepin County, 441 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn. 1989).
1993]
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
(2) the employee sought and is qualified for the job she held;
(3) the employee was discharged, despite her qualifications; and
(4) after discharge, the employer assigned a non-member of the
protected class to do the same work. 60
If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to the employer to present evidence of a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason for its actions.61 The employer's reason for ter-
mination must be based on sufficiently objective criteria so the court
can determine whether the employee has demonstrated pretext.6 2
If the employer alleges a sufficiently legitimate reason, then the
employee has the opportunity to show that the reason orjustification
stated by the employer is a pretext for discrimination.63 To avoid
summary judgment, the employee must present specific facts show-
ing that a discriminatory reason motivated the employer or that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.64 To
prevail, the employee must persuade the court that the employer in-
tentionally discriminated because of a disability.65
D. Disparate Impact
Disparate impact occurs when an employer's practice has the effect
of discrimination, although the practice does not appear or intend to
discriminate.66 The employer may defend against a disparate impact
charge by showing that the challenged business practice is uniformly
applied, job-related, consistent with job necessity, and that any other
practice cannot be reasonably accommodated. 6 7
When a disability discrimination claim brought under the MHRA
does not involve a dispute about disparate treatment or if there is
direct evidence of discrimination, the complainant must demonstrate
60. See, e.g., Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 442 (Minn.
1983); Miller v. Centennial State Bank, 472 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991);
Rutherford v. County of Kandiyohi, 449 N.W.2d 457, 461 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 1990).
61. Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. 1986) (citing Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).
62. Pretext is defined as "pretense; false appearance; ostensible reason or motive
assigned or assumed as a color or cover for the real reason or motive." WEBSTER'S
NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1426 (2d ed. 1983). See Feges v. Perkins
Restaurants, Inc., 465 N.W.2d 75, 78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing State v. Scientific
Computers, Inc., 393 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)), affd in part and rev d in
part, 483 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. 1992).
63. Sigurdson, 386 N.W.2d at 720 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(c) (1993).
67. Id. § 1630.15(c). Two examples of legitimate disparate impact practices are
business policies which require the employee to have a driver's license and an em-
ployer's no-leave policy. Id.
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that she falls within one of the classes of individuals protected by the
MHRA before a court will determine whether recourse is available
under the MHRA.68 To demonstrate membership in a protected
class, the individual must show that she is mentally or physically im-
paired (or has a record of impairment, or is regarded as having an
impairment), 69 that the impairment is a substantial limitation,70 and
that the substantial limitation results from the impairment and af-
fects one or more life activities. 71 If the complainant can prove each
of the above-mentioned factors, then she meets the definition of a
"disabled person" under the MHRA and may proceed with an em-
ployment discrimination claim. 72
III. LINDGREN V HARMON GLAss Co.
A. Facts
Patricia Lindgren worked as a secretary for Harmon Glass Com-
pany and suffered from rheumatoid arthritis. 73 While employed by
Harmon Glass, Lindgren underwent nine surgical procedures 74 to
68. Cooper v. Hennepin County, 441 N.W.2d 106, 110 n.1 (Minn. 1989).
69. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
70. The Minnesota Supreme Court has looked to the Code of Federal Regula-
tions for guidance in interpreting and defining the requirement that the impairment
be a substantial limitation. Cooper, 441 N.W.2d at 111. The federal regulations de-
fine substantial limitations as the degree that the impairment affects employability. If
a disabled individual is likely to experience difficulty in securing, retaining or advanc-
ing in employment, this individual would be considered substantially limited. Id. (cit-
ing 41 C.F.R. app. § 60 (1987)). The Minnesota Supreme Court also listed factors to
be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a person is "substantially
limited":
(a) the number and types of jobs from which the impaired individual is
disqualified;
(b) the geographic area to which the applicant has reasonable access;
(c) the applicant's own job expectations and training;
(d) the criteria or qualifications in use generally; and
(e) the types of jobs to which the rejection would apply.
Cooper, 441 N.W.2d at 111 (citing E. E. Black Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088,
1100-01 (D. Hawaii 1980)). Under Black, "all employers offering the same job or
similar jobs would use the same requirement or screening process" in employment
situations. Id.
71. See supra note 20.
72. Cooper, 441 N.W.2d at 110.
73. Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992). Lindgren began her career at Harmon Glass as a
temporary clerk typist in 1972, was promoted to a full-time clerk typist in 1973, and
promoted again to full secretary in 1974, where she remained until her termination
in 1990. See Appellant's Brief at 1, Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (No. CI-92-238), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992).
74. As a direct result of her arthritis, it was necessary for Lindgren to undergo
extensive surgeries, which included a hip joint replacement, three follow-up hip revi-
sion procedures, knuckle replacement on both hands, and two bone grafts. See Ap-
pellant's Brief at 2.
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combat the effects of her arthritis.75 In August 1989, Lindgren's su-
pervisor approached her for the first time about her medical ab-
sences, telling Lindgren that further surgeries might result in a
reassessment of her employment.76
In November 1989, Lindgren's supervisor again approached her
about her medical absences, reiterating that he would "have to take a
serious look at her continued employment" if she were to require
major surgery again. 77 The supervisor did not discuss any perform-
ance problems at either of the meetings with Lindgren.78
In February 1990, Lindgren's artificial hip dislocated, requiring
emergency surgery. 79 Prior to Lindgren's return to work, she was
informed that her employment was terminated, effective
immediately.80
Harmon Glass contended that Lindgren's attendance record was
unacceptable regardless of the cause of her absences. 8 l Harmon
Glass stated that, even had the absences been caused by something
other than her rheumatoid arthritis, the employment decision would
have been the same.8 2 Additionally, Harmon Glass maintained that
Ms. Lindgren's attendance at work was an important part of her job,
and that her absences "adversely affected the business." 8 3
The trial court granted summary judgment for Harmon Glass on
all claims.84
75. Lindgren, 489 N.W.2d at 806. Each surgical procedure Lindgren underwent
was medically necessary to keep her vocationally functional, and each required three
to five weeks of recuperation. Appellant's Brief at 2. With the exception of a Febru-
ary 1990 emergency surgery, all of the operations were scheduled in advance and the
dates were known to Harmon Glass, to "create a minimum of disruption in her job."
Lindgren, 489 N.W.2d at 806. Between March 1989 and March 1990, the year imme-
diately prior to her termination from employment, Ms. Lindgren underwent three
surgeries and missed 63 days of work. Id.
76. Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992). Lindgren's supervisor also expressed concern
over a vacation that Lindgren was planning to take after her medical/disability leave.
Lindgren went on vacation as planned because she would have forfeited a substantial
deposit if she had not gone as scheduled. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Appellant's Brief at 2.
80. Lindgren, 489 N.W.2d at 807. Upon Lindgren's termination, the supervisor
wrote a letter to Lindgren stating in part, "[i]t was difficult to have to make the deci-
sion that your arthritis is now preventing you from being able to perform your job
responsibilities. I do care about you, and I want to do what is fair and just for you, at




84. Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), re-
view denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992). In addition to Lindgren's disability discrimination
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B. The Court's Holding and Analysis
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court and
held that excessive absenteeism was a legitimate and nondiscrimina-
tory reason for terminating a disabled employee, even when the ab-
senteeism was directly related to the employee's disability.85
Although the court questioned whether Lindgren's poor job per-
formance as articulated by Harmon Glass was the real reason for Lin-
dgren's discharge,86 the court concluded that excessive absenteeism
was the real reasons for Lindgren's termination.
8 7
The court also found that Lindgren's poor attendance record was
a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for discharge and addressed the
ramifications of Lindgren's disability being the cause of her ab-
sences. 88 According to the court, the direct link between the disabil-
ity, the absences, and the termination did not automatically render
Harmon Glass' termination decision discriminatory.89 Consistent
with Minnesota precedent, the court maintained that problems cre-
ated by a disability may be a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for
termination.90 The court concluded that Lindgren's absenteeism af-
fected her job performance because her job required regular
attendance.9 1
Finding that Lindgren failed to establish that Harmon Glass had
and lack of reasonable accommodation claims she brought claims for breach of con-
tract and defamation. Id. at 806.
85. Id. at 809-11.
86. Id. at 808. The court discussed testimony given by three of Lindgren's super-
iors which stated that they were "concerned about Lindgren's attitude, the amount of
work she was able to handle, and the effect her inefficiencies had on the office." Id.
The court found it significant that these concerns were never brought to Lindgren's
attention prior to termination nor discussed among the superiors when they were
deciding Lindgren's continued employment status. Id. Additionally, the court
pointed to substantial evidence showing Lindgren's favorable employment record.
Id.
87. Id. The court relied on evidence presented by Harmon Glass and testimony
given by Lindgren in deciding that there were no disputed facts. Id. Harmon Glass
presented evidence that Lindgren's absenteeism was excessive. Lindgren testified
that she recognized her discharge was based on her absenteeism after her surgeries.
Id.
88. Id. at 809. The Lindgren court referred to a recent Minnesota Supreme Court
decision, Shockency v. Jefferson Lines, 439 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. 1989), where it was
held that a bus company had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharging a
black employee who had a history of alcohol abuse, tardiness, and unexcused ab-
sences. Id. at 808.
89. Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 808 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992).
90. Id. at 809 (citing Miller v. Centennial State Bank, 472 N.W.2d 349, 353-54
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991)). In Miller, problems with the employee's performance caused
by the employee's sleep apnea constituted a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
termination. Miller, 472 N.W.2d at 353-54.
91. Lindgren, 489 N.W.2d at 809.
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an undisclosed, discriminatory motive for the termination decision,
or that absenteeism (Harmon Glass' stated reason) was a pretext for
discrimination, the court held that Lindgren had not met her burden
under the McDonnell Douglas test.9 2
The Lindgren court also held that Lindgren could not be further
accommodated for her excessive absenteeism, and justified its deci-
sion on three grounds.93 First, Lindgren's disability kept her from
performing one essential function of her job: regular attendance.94
Second, it was beyond reasonable accommodation to expect Harmon
Glass to provide a substitute employee to actually perform Lin-
dgren's job functions every time she was absent. 95 Third, Harmon
Glass' refusal to continue to hire temporary help during future ab-
sences was not unreasonable, even if Lindgren's prognosis showed
that future surgeries or extended absences were unlikely.96 The
court noted that Harmon Glass already attempted to accommodate
Lindgren's disability for twelve years.97 In conclusion, the court
held that Harmon Glass' accommodation of Lindgren's disability was
"entirely reasonable."98
IV. ANALYSIS OF LIADGREN
The question raised by Lindgren-whether necessary medical ab-
sences resulting directly from an employee's disability are a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate the employee-was an
92. Id. The court noted that Lindgren made no claims regarding unfair treat-
ment, bias, prejudice, or being subjected to insults while employed by Harmon Glass.
Id. The court also noted that Lindgren failed to show pretext by establishing that it
was more likely that Harmon Glass' motives were improper or biased, or that Har-
mon Glass' proffered explanation was not credible. Id. In general, evidence of the
treatment of the employee and the general policy and practice of the employer may
be relevant. Id.
93. Id. at 810. The court, after reviewing the statutes defining reasonable accom-
modation in the work place and qualified disabled persons, concluded that Harmon
Glass did not violate the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Id. at 809.
94. Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 809 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992). Additionally, the court noted that, although it was
undisputed that Lindgren could perform her job when present, she could not do so
when she was absent. Id.
95. Id. at 810.
96. Id. at 809. The court referred to a prior holding rejecting an employer's
claim that accommodation was unreasonable. See LaMott v. Apple Valley Health
Care Ctr., Inc., 465 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). The LaMott court's
reasoning was based, in part, on the fact that the employee's co-worker would not do
the employee's work, but that the two would work together. Id.
97. Lindgren, 489 N.W.2d at 810. Lindgren argued that Harmon Glass did not
reasonably accommodate her disability because Lindgren's supervisor admitted that
he made the termination decision without any information regarding her medical




issue of first impression in Minnesota. The Lindgren opinion nar-
rowly construed the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
standards in a manner unfavorable to qualified disabled employees
in need of medical leave.
The analysis below will show an alternative view of the Lindgren
case. First, the McDonnell Douglas test will be applied to the facts.
Second, two crucial threshold factors which the court did not scruti-
nize in their holding, undue hardship to Harmon Glass and Lin-
dgren's medical prognosis, will be discussed. Third, the purposes of
the MHRA provision governing disability discrimination in the work-
place will be considered in light of its actual language.
A. The McDonnell Douglas Test
1. Prima Facie Case
Although Minnesota has never considered whether individuals af-
flicted with rheumatoid arthritis are members of a protected class,99
Lindgren could have met the protected class requirement by show-
ing that her arthritis substantially limited one or more major life ac-
tivities.100 To meet the requirement of being qualified for her
position, Lindgren needed to show that she met the minimum objec-
tive qualification of the job.lO1 Because there was no dispute that
99. In Manderscheid v. Beyer, 413 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), the
court noted that there would be no determination of whether arthritis would be con-
sidered a "disability" for statutory purposes because there was a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason given for the employee's discharge. However, the court in
McMullen v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 434 N.W.2d 830, 831 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988) did treat plaintiff's rheumatoid arthritis as a disability for the purpose of deter-
mining whether his employer should have accommodated his arthritis as mandated
by Wisconsin's Fair Employment Act.
100. Lindgren's rheumatoid arthritis has "impacted every aspect of her life. She is
unable to partake in any strenuous activity requiring significant pressure to be placed
on her arthritic joints." Appellant's Brief at 16. See Brookshaw v. South St. Paul
Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In Brookshaw, the court refused to
consider a disability discrimination claim because the employee failed to demonstrate
by either affidavit or deposition evidence a factual question that his ulcer or mental
stress substantially limited any of his major life activities. Id. at 36.
101. See Khalifa v. Hennepin County, 420 N.W.2d 634, 640 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(citing Legrand v. University of Arkansas, 821 F.2d 478, 481 (8th Cir. 1987)), review
denied (Minn. May 4, 1988); see also Swanson v. West Publishing Co., No. C9-88-1553,
1989 WL 1556, (Minn. Ct. App., Jan. 17, 1989). In Swanson, the appellant was not
performing his job in a satisfactory fashion and his job evaluations and employment
record as a whole generally reflected marginal to poor performance. Id. at *2. Fur-
ther, the employee conceded that he did not have the necessary powers of mental
concentration to enable him to perform the essential functions of the job. Id. The
court concluded that the employee was "unable to establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory discharge so as to withstand a summary judgment motion." Id.
In McCarthy v. Redeemer Residence, Inc., No. C9-87-1946, 1988 WL 31407, at
*2 (Minn. Ct. App. April 5, 1988), the employee attempted to perform essential job
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Lindgren could perform her job when she was present, 0 2 she was
deemed qualified for her job.
Further, there was no dispute that Lindgren was fired or that one
of Lindgren's co-workers, a nonmember of a protected class, was as-
signed to take over Lindgren's work. 103 In sum, Lindgren met her
burden of establishing a prima facie case.
2. Answer and Pretext
Once Lindgren established a prima facie case, Harmon Glass had
to show that Lindgren's absences constituted a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason for her discharge. Although the Minnesota
Supreme Court has held that tardiness and unexcused absences may
justify dismissal,104 the court has not determined that medically nec-
essary, excused absences provide a legitimate and nondiscriminatory
reason for firing a disabled person.
A survey of case law from other jurisdictions shows a focus on nar-
row, fact specific elements, making it difficult to develop a concise
statement of the law. The cases can be grouped into two categories:
whether the absences are communicated to the employer in ad-
vance' 05 and whether a set, rigid employee attendance schedule is a
matter of convenience or necessity to the employer.'
0 6
functions when she was unable to do so and endangered the health and safety of the
elderly residents of whom she was in charge. The court held that her actions negated
any claim she might have had as a qualified disabled person, and her prima facie case
failed. Id.
In Biltz v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985),
the court held that the employer did not discriminatorily discharge a pilot who had
been diagnosed as alcoholic where he did not possess bona fide occupational criteria
for the job, having had his medical certificate revoked and having refused to seek
treatment to obtain certification. Id.
102. Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 809 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992).
103. See Appellant's Brief at 18.
104. See Shockency v. Jefferson Lines, 439 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. 1989); see also
Miller v. Centennial State Bank, 472 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (hold-
ing that performance problems causally related to the disability were a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for discharge); Strand v. County of Hennepin, No. C 1-90-
2020, 1991 WL 26050 (Minn. Ct. App. March 5, 1991) (determining that the em-
ployee had not sufficiently refuted the employer's evidence of inadequate job
performance).
105. See Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp 481 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (requiring ad-
vance notice and proper documentation substantiating where the absent employee
had been and submitting an appropriate leave request), afd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir.
1987).
106. See Carr v. Barr, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 41,651, at 71,728 (D.D.C.June
23, 1992) (stating attendance is considered a minimum function of anyjob); Magel v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 776 F. Supp. 200, 203 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (determining regular
attendance was an essential function of employee's position), af-d, 5 F.3d 1490 (3d
Cir. 1993); Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 309 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding
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Other courts have held that when a plaintiffs supervisor cannot
rely on the attendance of a qualified disabled employee, accommoda-
tion is not necessary. In Wimbley v. Bolger,107 a disabled postal worker
was terminated for his absences from work, which were necessitated
by his need to secure medical treatment for his disability.108 In up-
holding the nondiscriminatory nature of the termination, the Federal
District Court of Tennessee emphasized that the employee was enti-
tled to be absent from work to obtain treatment without being disci-
plined, "but he had the obligation to notify his supervisor in advance
that he would be absent."109 His failure to comply with the appro-
priate leave request to cover his absences formed a legitimate non-
discriminatory basis for his termination.10o
In Walders v. Garrett, "' a Navy civilian employee afflicted with
chronic fatigue immune dysfunction syndrome was discharged for
excessive absenteeism resulting directly from her disability."12 The
Federal District Court of Virginia ruled that the Navy lawfully dis-
charged her.' 13 In support of the holding, the court cited plaintiff's
random absenteeism rate and minimal prescheduled medical ap-
pointments.' '4 The court found that the plaintiff's supervisors could
not count on her attendance or predict her absences.' 5
although perfect attendance is not a necessary element of all jobs, reasonably regular
and predictable attendance is necessary for many), aff'd, 956 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir.
1992); Santiago v. Temple Univ., 739 F. Supp. 974, 979 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (discussing
standard attendance policy), afd, 928 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1991); Silk v. Huck Installa-
tion & Equip. Div., 486 N.Y.S.2d 406, 406 (App. Div. 1985) (holding that employer's
dismissal was not discriminatory when job required consistent good performance).
107. 642 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 485.
110. Id.
111. 765 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Va. 1991).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 312.
114. Id. at 310.
115. Id. See also Carr v. Barr, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,651, at 71,729
(D.D.C.June 23, 1992) (holding employee's repeated failure to follow the established
procedures for reporting her disability-related absences was more a matter of disci-
pline than related to her disability); Magel v. Federal Reserve Bank, 776 F. Supp.
200, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (stating employee's chronic absenteeism caused by asthma,
where she was essentially unable to work in the winter months, constituted a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory basis for discharge), af'd, 5 F.3d 1490 (3d Cir. 1993); Santi-
ago v. Temple Univ., 739 F. Supp. 974, 979 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (determining employee
with intermittent eye inflammation was unable to be present at work in any predict-
able or reliable manner and subsequent uncertainty and risk of employee's being
allowed to sporadically appear at his emergency room job was legitimate basis for
discharge), affid, 928 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1991); Matzo v. Postmaster Gen., 685 F. Supp.
260, 263 (D.D.C. 1987) (explaining postal service lawfully dismissed employee with
mental illness due to repeated absences without leave), affd, 861 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 547 N.E.2d 499, 508 (Ill.
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Courts have also found it necessary to consider whether attend-
ance is a matter of convenience or necessity to the employer. In
Magel v. Federal Reserve Bank, 1 6 the court held that a disabled super-
visor's job required her to be present." t 7 The job could not be ade-
quately performed from her home, by telephone, from the hospital,
or by substitution.' 18 Moreover, her absences reduced output, in-
creased the need for overtime, adversely affected the staffis produc-
tivity, reduced the quality and timeliness of her work unit's output,
and affected the morale of her staff members.' 19 The court con-
cluded that her medically related absences constituted a lawful basis
for her discharge.12 0
Likewise, in Silk v. Huck Installation & Equipment Division,121 the em-
ployer specifically advised the disabled employee that attendance in
her new position was critical.122 Because herjob required consistent
attendance, which she had actual notice of, the employee's subse-
quent termination based on her frequent and erratic attendance was
lawful. 12 3
In Lindgren, with the exception of her last emergency surgery, all of
Lindgren's absences were planned in advance, giving Harmon Glass
the opportunity to schedule accordingly.1 24 Moreover, Lindgren was
never told that her attendance was a critical requirement of her
App. Ct. 1989) (stating an employee afflicted with endometriosis was unlawfully dis-
charged based on absences due to pre-planned surgeries to combat her disease), ap-
peal denied, 550 N.E.2d 556 (Ill. 1990); Card v. Sielaff, 586 N.Y.S.2d 191, 194 (Sup.
Ct. 1992) (declaring pregnant employee's termination based on a record of excessive
absenteeism and lateness attributable to her pregnancy and subsequent abortion may
have been discriminatory); Giaquinto v. New York Tel. Co., 522 N.Y.S.2d 329, 330
(App. Div. 1987) (holding employee's absences resulting from various illnesses and
hospital stays exceeded the number allowed by the employer's long-established ab-
sence control plan, so termination was not discriminatory), appeal denied, 532 N.E.2d
101 (N.Y. 1988); Silk v. Huck Installation & Equip. Div., 486 N.Y.S.2d (App. Div.
1985) (maintaining that a disabled secretary who persistently took days off and was
warned at least four times that her rate of attendance was unacceptable was lawfully
terminated).
116. 776 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
117. Id. at 205.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 203.
120. Id. at 201.
121. 486 N.Y.S.2d 406 (App. Div. 1985).
122. Id. at 406.
123. Id. at 407; see also Giaquinto v. New York Tel. Co., 522 N.Y.S.2d 329, 330
(App. Div. 1987) (holding that employer's decision to dismiss employee because of
excessive absenteeism was not unlawful discrimination when the disabled employee
was specifically told that good attendance was necessary for the employer to effec-
tively provide communication services), appeal denied, 532 N.E.2d 101 (N.Y. 1988).
124. Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992).
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job.125 Harmon Glass' advance notice of Lindgren's absences and
the lack of a set, rigid attendance schedule indicates Lindgren's dis-
charge was based more on her disability than her attendance record.
B. Reasonable Accommodation: Undue Hardship
The Lindgren court failed to analyze whether the accommodation
necessary to employ Lindgren would create undue hardship to Har-
mon Glass. The accommodation Lindgren needed was the provision
of aides on a temporary or periodic basis, which is authorized by the
MHRA.126 Thus, because Lindgren is a qualified disabled person,
whose employer has more than twenty-five employees, and an ac-
commodation to the known disability has been identified, the accom-
modation was mandatory unless Harmon Glass showed undue
hardship. 127
The term "undue hardship" was created to relieve an employer of
the obligation to make an accommodation when it would be an un-
justifiable burden.128 The Minnesota Court of Appeals has consid-
ered two cases regarding undue hardship.129 In LaMott v. Apple Valley
Health Center Inc.,130 the court held there was no undue hardship to
the employer where the aid of a second worker was required to ac-
commodate an employee's disability.131 The employer's position
that a team cleaning approach132 would be cost prohibitive and im-
possible to implement was deemed unreasonable.133
In Karst v. F. C. Hayer Co. ,134 the court acknowledged that a change
in job assignments and assistance from co-workers in doing heavy
lifting may not create an undue hardship to the employer.' 35 The
court noted these accommodations would not cause any change in
business and accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the employer. 136
125. See Appellant's Brief at 12.
126. MINN. STAT. § 363.03(l)(6) (1992).
127. Id.
128. Gerald T. Holtzman et al., Reasonable Accommodation of the Disabled Ilorker -A
Job for the Man or a Man for the Job?, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 279, 299 (1992).
129. See LaMott v. Apple Valley Health Ctr., Inc., 465 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991); Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., 429 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'don other
grounds, 447 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1989).
130. 465 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
131. Id. at 591.
132. The plan required two housekeepers to work together on a floor and when
the tasks were completed on that floor, they would move to a second floor. Id.
133. Id.
134. 429 N.W,2d 318 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'don other grounds, 447 N.W.2d 180
(Minn. 1989).
135. Id. at 322.
136. Id.; see also Ferguson v. United States Dep't. of Commerce, 680 F. Supp. 1514
(M.D. Fla. 1988). In Ferguson, the court required that the employer give an employee
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Other jurisdictions have also addressed whether accommodating
medically related absences creates undue hardship to the employer.
In Walders v. Garrett, 13 7 the Federal District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia found undue hardship where the employee sought to
work only when her illness permitted.' 38 Other accommodations,
such as removing leave restrictions or modifying the employer's
work schedule, would not have enabled her to maintain regular at-
tendance.139 The court noted that no one else was able to take the
employee's place while she was absent.140 In addition, the court
noted the employee worked in a division comprised of a small group
of employees where each was required to work under strict dead-
lines, maintaining high productivity levels.141 Under these circum-
stances, allowing the employee frequent and unpredictable absences
created an undue hardship for the employer.142
In Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Human Rights Commission,143 the Illi-
nois Court of Appeals determined that placing an employee in a unit
utilizing a flexible "non-scheduled days" system countered predict-
able absences caused by her disability and posed no undue hardship
to the employer.144 The court found that making this accommoda-
tion would not be overly expensive or unduly disruptive because the
system was already in place. 145 The court thus held that the em-
ployer unlawfully discriminated against the employee by unreasona-
bly failing to provide an available accommodation and by not
permitting the employee to rectify her attendance problem.14 6
suffering from alcoholism another chance, provided he was otherwise found fit for
employment, despite a three year record that included 389 absences. Id. at 1518.
The court reasoned that the employer's failure to recognize and confront the prob-
lem sooner had aggravated the employee's problems and made accommodation (in
the form of another chance) appropriate. Id.
137. 765 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Va. 1991).
138. Id. at 313.
139. Id.
140. Id. Walders attempted to compare her situation with a disabled secretary,
Kathy Jorden, who worked for the same employer. Id. The Navy provided Jorden
with unpaid leave, advances in sick leave, and participation in a leave transfer pro-
gram and flex-time. Id. Jorden was not disciplined for her absences. Id. at 313.
Jorden testified that even though her disability required her to use large amounts of
leave, she was able to meet deadlines and otherwise fulfill her job responsibilities. Id.
In distinguishing Walders' situation, the court noted that Walders' responsibilities
included more stringent deadlines. Id. More importantly, when Jorden missed work,
other secretaries either filled her post or assumed her work by means of a common
computer network. Id.
141. Id.
142. Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 314 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd, 956 F.2d
1163 (4th Cir. 1992).
143. 547 N.E.2d 499 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 550 N.E.2d 556 (1990).





In Carr v. Barr,14 7 a District of Columbia court decided that chronic
long-term absenteeism was a condition that could not be accommo-
dated without undue hardship.148 The court refused to require the
employer to allow the employee unrestricted flexibility in her arrivals
and departures.149 Reassignment was unavailable because unpre-
dictable and unexplained absences would be detrimental to her per-
formance of any available job.150 Planning and scheduling for other
employees would be "unthinkable without some type of reliance." 151
Any attempt to accommodate the employee would have resulted in
undue hardship to the employer.15 2
The Lindgren court stated that the provision of a substitute em-
ployee to perform Lindgren's job functions every time she was ab-
sent was not a reasonable accommodation.15 3 Yet the fact that
Lindgren was previously hospitalized and remained employed was
strong evidence. that Harmon Glass could accommodate her disabil-
ity-related absences. Why else would Harmon Glass acquiesce to a
long-term employee's previous hospitalizations and then suddenly
claim it was too much of an inconvenience or hardship to continue
the employment?
Certainly an employee convalescing from a disability should not
expect the employer to keep the position open indefinitely. The abil-
ity to report to work is one of the qualifications of employment. But,
in situations where a job is not unique, other workers may fill in and
perform the tasks of a disabled worker who is temporarily
hospitalized.
Lindgren was not absent on a day-to-day basis; she required blocks
of disability time. 154 The majority of her absences, unlike those in
Carr, were predictable and explainable. Her secretarial job was not
specialized as in Walders. 155 Like LaMott,156 Lindgren presented
facts that were ideal for accommodation with minimum disruption or
inconvenience to the employer.15 7 Mere administrative annoyance,
147. 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,651, at 71,724 (D.D.C. June 23, 1992).




152. Carrv. Barr, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,651, at 71,729 (D.D.C.June 23,
1992).
153. Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992).
154. See supra note 75.
155. Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Va. 1991), affrd, 956 F.2d 1163
(4th Cir. 1992).
156. LaMott v. Apple Valley Health Care Ctr., Inc., 465 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991).
157. Similar to the LaMott team cleaning approach, which a job coach testified
would be necessary for one to two years, Harmon Glass could easily seek a medical
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such as arranging for a temporary worker, should not be sufficient
hardship to preclude accommodation.158 Both the nature of Lin-
dgren's job and her ability to give ample notice of any impending
hospitalizations allowed Harmon Glass to schedule an aide, without
undue disruption to its business operations.
C. Reasonable Accommodation: Prognosis
The Lindgren court should have given proper attention to Harmon
Glass' failure to appraise Lindgren's medical condition and progno-
sis. 15 9 To consider prognosis before terminating a qualified disabled
employee is essential in determining whether reasonable accommo-
dation is possible.160
Inconsistent with its Lingren holding, the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals recently reversed a summary judgment because the employer,
prior to terminating the employee, did not know the employee's
prognosis.161 The employer assumed that the employee's future
medical condition would be the same as it had been, precluding full-
opinion on Lindgren's prognosis and plan on hiring temporary workers for any antic-
ipated absences. Like LaMott, Harmon Glass should study the feasibility and reason-
ableness of cost and implementation for a potential accommodation. See LaMott, 465
N.W.2d at 591.
158. See, e.g., Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), afd, 732
F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985). In Nelson, the court ruled
that social utility justified requiring the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare
to provide readers to three blind income maintenance workers. Id. With the accom-
modation, the blind workers were able to perform their jobs as well as sighted work-
ers. Id. at 370. The court weighed the social costs of refusing the accommodation
against the economic costs of providing the accommodation. Id. at 370-71. The
court reasoned that "[wihen one considers the social costs which would flow from the
exclusion of persons such as the plaintiffs from the pursuit of their profession, the
modest cost of accommodation-a cost which seems likely to diminish as technology
advances and proliferates-seems by comparison, quite small." Id. at 382.
159. Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), re-
view denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992). The court summarily dismissed consideration of
Lindgren's prognosis stating that Harmon Glass had already done its fair share of
reasonable accommodation. Id. at 810. The Minnesota Human Rights Act, however,
mandates that in order for an employer to claim the undue hardship exception to the
reasonable accommodation requirement, there must be "documented good faith ef-
forts to explore less restrictive or less expensive alternatives, including consultation
with the disabled person or with knowledgeable disabled persons or organizations."
MINN. STAT. § 363.03(l)(6)(e) (1992). There is no evidence that Harmon Glass ful-
filled these duties. Lindgren, 489 N.W.2d at 810.
160. See Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the
ADA: Selected Issues, C742 ALI-ABA 1199 (1992). Fitzpatrick notes the employer
should not make medical judgments. Rather, the employer should consult with a
doctor and/or the disabled employee to determine whether reasonable accommoda-
tion is possible, and the form in which it should take. Id. at 1215.
161. Finn v. Nat'l Camera Exch. Inc., No. C9-92-97, 1992 WL 145330, at *3
(Minn. Ct. App. June 30, 1992).
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time work.162 The court refused to decide whether the termination
decision was lawful without knowing exactly what information the
employer had prior to termination. 6 3
In Walders,164 the Virginia federal district court made a specific
finding that a similar rate of absenteeism for the employee would
occur in the future.165 Based on that finding, the court concluded
that no accommodation was possible.16 6 Similarly, in Illinois Bell,1
6 7
the Illinois appellate court relied on the employer's admission that
the employee was discharged because the employer perceived no
change in her physical condition after surgery.168 This finding alone
was the basis of the human rights commission's holding of unlawful
discriminatory discharge, which was affirmed by the appellate
court. 1
69
Lastly, in Carr,170 findings of fact showed both the employee and
her doctor acknowledged that she would never be capable of regular
work attendance.171 The court concluded that the lingering and un-
predictable nature of the employee's medical attacks would keep her
from maintaining any fixed or modified schedule, and therefore
would preclude accommodation. 7 2
The Lindgren court stated that, regardless of Lindgren's prognosis,
Harmon Glass' refusal to continue to hire temporary help during fu-
ture absences was not unreasonable. 7 3 The duty to accommodate a
disabled employee, however, requires looking toward the future for
the best solution for both the employer and the employee. 74 The
court's refusal to consider prognosis is contrary to established case
and statutory law. Only when facts demonstrated that Lindgren's
prognosis was such that future surgeries or extended absences were




164. Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd, 956 F.2d 1163
(4th Cir. 1992).
165. Id. at 306.
166. Id. at 314.
167. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 547 N.E.2d 499 (I1l. App. Ct.
1989), appeal denied, 550 N.E.2d 556 (Il1. 1990).
168. Id. at 508.
169. Id.
170. Carr v. Barr, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,651, at 71,724 (D.D.C.June 23,
1992).
171. Id. at 71,728.
172. Id.
173. Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992).
174. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03(l)(6)(e) (1992).
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D. Goals of the Minnesota Human Rights Act
The Minnesota Human Rights Act requires an employer to reason-
ably accommodate a qualified disabled employee's disability unless
there is undue hardship.175 The goal of the disability discrimination
statute is to facilitate the return of disabled workers into the work
force.176 The MHRA contemplates providing job restructuring and
aids for disabled employees.177 Indeed, "Minnesota's disabled citi-
zens are an untapped resource that is willing and able, with assist-
ance from employers and the state, to make a productive
contribution to our society."1 7 8
In balancing the equities between society's interests and the inter-
ests of business, often times there is a price to be paid by business in
the interest of social progress. Other times, social agendas must be
compromised in the name of economics. With regard to qualified
disabled woikers, the Minnesota legislature has clearly targeted the
advancement of disabled persons in the work force as a priority.179
With that priority in mind, the Minnesota Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that the provisions of the MHRA are to be liberally
construed. 180
While instructive, the MHRA falls short of providing a bright line
test for the legality of firing a disabled person due to medically nec-
essary absences. The MHRA fails to address accommodating
planned, medically necessary absences. There are thousands of dis-
abled Minnesota citizens, many of whom require periodic short-term
175. Id.
176. LaMott v. Apple Valley Health Care Ctr., Inc., 465 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991). Additional goals and missions of disabled persons and groups repre-
senting them have been outlined:
(1) To assist persons with disabilities to secure maximum independence
and self-sufficiency by having equal access to employment opportunities;
(2) To assure employment opportunities are based on objective evaluations
and not subjective presumptions;
(3) To assist persons with disabilities to live independently, and to fully par-
ticipate in the community;
(4) To promote the dignity, safety, and rights of disabled persons;
(5) To eliminate confusion over the issue of minimum qualifications and
reasonable accommodation;
(6) To provide employment placement and vocational services for disabled
persons and to assist them in reentering previous employment or funding
alternative employment suited to their strengths and abilities; and
(7) To assist persons with disabilities to avoid relying on federal and state
tax dollars, depending on public assistance, or existing on subsistence levels
of income.
Cooper v. Hennepin County, 441 N.W.2d 106, 113 (Minn. 1989).
177. MINN. STAT. § 363.03(1)(6) (1992).
178. LaMott, 465 N.W.2d at 591.
179. See MINN. STAT. § 363.01 (1992).
180. See Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 248 (Minn. 1980); see also
City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 89, 239 N.W.2d 197, 203 (1976).
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disability-related medical leave to secure long-term vocational abil-
ity. Certainly, the right of these disabled workers to maintain their
health and keep their jobs is part of the MHRA's intent.
Permitting an employer to remove a disabled worker from the
workplace because she required surgery to remain functional for her
job's duties is contrary to the goal of the disability protection under
the MHRA. Such an action, however, appears allowable under the
MHRA's current language.18, The MHRA has a loophole in its disa-
bility anti-discrimination provision. It is silent on the commonly oc-
curring issue of disability-related absenteeism, except for the vague
balancing mechanism which exists under the auspices of the reason-
able accommodation provision. Clearly, this allows for cases such as
Lindgren to fall between the cracks. While Lindgren's discharge is
not legally sanctionable under the MHRA, it is contrary to its under-
lying purpose. The legislature must re-examine the MHRA and in-
clude language specifically addressing absenteeism and medically
necessary leave from work.
V. CONCLUSION
The Lindgren court construed the facts and the MHRA to nega-
tively affect disabled employees in need of periodic, medically neces-
sary absences. In determining whether Harmon Glass could
reasonably accommodate Lindgren, the court should have consid-
ered her prognosis, the true consequences or hardship to Harmon
Glass resulting from the accommodation, and the intent underlying
the MHRA. To prevent cases like Lindgren from continuing to be
dismissed, the MHRA should offer qualified disabled persons protec-
tion from discharge based on medically necessary absences directly
related to the disability. Without such protection, employers can dis-
charge disabled employees for absences beyond their control. The
law must be revised, giving disabled employees a greater chance of
fair and equal treatment in the workplace.
181. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03(1)(6) (1992).
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